Distributed database transactions are treated as atomic operations. This paper considers intrusion masking atomic operations among replica groups. The paper proposes two Byzantine fault tolerant two-phase commit protocols (BFT-2PC) to tolerate both malicious coordinator and malicious participants. When the total number of malicious replicas is no more than a specific threshold the protocols can mask attacks. Even if the number of faulty replicas is more than the threshold our protocols are still survivable in some cases. We analyzed the expected survivability and efficiency of our protocols. The analytic results demollstrate that our protocols are practical.
Introduction
Intrusion tolerance is commonly achieved by replications [2, 6, 11, 14, 4] in distributed systems. Most of those techniques adopt the state machine approach [13] which ensures that replicated servers that start consistent will remain consistent as long as they apply the same deterministic actions in the same order. In the configuration of state machine approach a client sends requests to a group of replicated servers (a replica group) to obtain services.
State machine approaches can tolerate usually no more than one third malicious replica group members, a few lost or delayed messages, and those malicious clients that send inconsistent requests to different replica servers .
At the same time, a hacked system may present arbitrary behaviors that can be modeled as Byzantine faults. So, Byzantine-fault tolerant algorithms can resist some malicious attacks. Applying Byzantine agreement algorithms to replicated database system for Byzantine fault tolerance has been discussed in [5] , which suggests replicate both processing and data of whole data base system, namely full replication. Furthermore, the only necessary application of Byzantine agreement algorithm is submission of transactions to all replicas for resisting malicious attacks. This idea is essentially the same as the state machine approaches. Thus, the intrusion masking problem is often mistakenly considered easy to achieve by just using the total order services provided by group communication systems that are Byzantine-fault tolerant.
But both the state machine approach and others do not supply a directly solution of intrusion masking for distributed atomic operations, which are usually implemented by the two phase commit (2PC) protocol.
In the situation where neither coordinator nor participants are replicated, C. Mohan et al. proposed a Byzantine fault tolerant distributed transaction commit and recovery protocol [10] . They applie the Byzantine agreement algorithm in the second phase of 2PC to prevent the coordinator from sending inconsistent voting result to different participants. This protocol can only tolerate malicious coordinator in the second phase. But it obviously cannot tolerate malicious participants in the first phase of 2PC. Even a single malicious participant can paralyze the whole system by simply voting 'NO' to force the coordinator making a wrong 'abort' decision. Besides, the cost of Byzantine agreement algorithm is too expensive to be practical.
While more and more critical servers are replicated to replica groups the problem becomes more complex. For example, many banks could replicate their servers to replica groups to achieve high availability and survivability. There are already some qualified state machine approach based algorithms to guarantee the intrusion masking property when the client is a single host and makes a invocation to a replica group. The distributed transactions among banks are treated as atomic operations, which are either wholly committed or wholly aborted. When a replica group of one bank wants to have a transaction with other replica groups of other banks, we hope these distributed transactions are also intrusion masking. Therefore, we need new atomic commit protocols that can not only offer the capability of intrusion masking but also handle the replications.
The solution is not trivial. A normally functioned system should be able to abort distributed transactions due to resource contention, such as dead locks. We cannot simply grant a node as the delegate of a replica group to carry out the atomic commit protocol because such delegate nodes may be malicious and may work as we mentioned before to paralyze the system while we cannot distinguish it from good nodes.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. As an example, we revised BFT [4] to demonstrate how to handle clients that are replica groups. Furthermore, we proposed two practical Byzantine-fault tolerant 2PC protocols for the distributed intrusion masking system. We analyzed the survivability and efficiency of these protocols.
2.
Handling clients that are replica groups
Message Passing between Replica Groups
A replica group with 71 replicas is a n-size-group. 
For all 9i, 1 i m, we say '0 contains g·i' Every replica in a n-size-group is assigned to a working group. Each element in a working group comes from different replica groups.
In Figure 2 Figure I . Examples of symmetric sending and asymmetric sending capability of fault tolerance. In the examples, replicas marked with checks are faulty replicas and messages marked with checks are faulty messages. The symmetric sending has less communication cost but worse capability of fault tolerance than those of asymmetric sending. A fault in a replica group will be propagated to the receiver in symmetric sending while asymmetric sending can resist such propagation of faults.
A distributed intrusion masking system consists of some replica groups, which can be organized in many different ways according to the method of message sending among them. We focus on two ways that we called symmetric configuration and asymmetric configuration in this paper.
In symmetric configuration a working group set must be constructed, which contains all replica groups in the system. Every two interactive replica groups in the system send messages by symmetric sending. An example of symmetric configuration is shown in Figure 2 An example of asymmetric conflguration as static assignment or dynamic management is beyond the scope of this paper.
In asymmetric configuration every two interactive replica groups in the system send messages by asymmetric sending. The number of replicas in each replica group may be ditferent. An example of asymmetric configuration is shown in Figure 3 . A2 interacts with all replicas in other replica groups, such as B l , B 2 ,' . . ,Bn and Gl , G2 ,' .. ,G k . The asymmetric configuration does not need management of working groups. So, asymmetric configuration iS6calable and easy to be configured and managed.
Replica group as client
Based on BFT [4] , we introduce a new Byzantine-Fault Tolerant protocol named BFT-S to meet the requirement of our communication schemes among replica groups. Please note our techniques are not limited on BFT. Our techniques can be applied to other similar protocols based on state machine approach.
We assume the client interacts with a 3k + I-size-group. k is the maximum number of Byzantine-faulty replicas in the group that can be tolerated. In our architecture, either a single node or a replica group could be a client.
Phase request and reply. When the client is a 3k + 1-size-group and the system is under symmetric configuration the client symmetrically sends the (SYMMETRIC-REQUEST, 0, t, c)(Jc message to the 3k + I-size-group. In the request t is the timestamp and 0 is the operation. C is a replica in the client. At the end ofBFT-S each replica i in 3k + 1-size-group symmetrically sends reply (SYMMETRIC-REPLY, v, t, c, i, r)rri to the client, where r is the result of request and v is the view number.
Otherwise, when the system is under asymmetric configuration (client is a single node or a replica group), or the client is a single node and the system is under symmetric configuration, the client asymmetrically sends the (ASYMMETRIC-REQUEST, 0, t, c)(Jc message to the 3k + 1-size-group. C is the client or a replica in the client. If the client is 3j + 1-size-group and the system is asymmetric configuration each replica in 3k + I-size-group should wait j + 1 matching requests as the request.
When the BFT-S finishes the reply (ASYMMETRIC-REPLY, v, t, c, i, 7-)(Ji will be asymmetrically sent to the client. Client waits a weak certificate as the result, which is k + 1 matching replies that have the same v. t, r and valid signature as BFT.
Phase pre-prepare. The primary assigns a sequence number n to the request and multicasts the request to other replicas in the pre-prepare phase. Each replica will accept the request if and only if the request from client matches the request from primary. Otherwise, it will simply discard the request.
The prepare phase and commit phase are the same as BFT. They can be simply described as follows. In the prepare phase and commit phase, each replica broadcasts signed request to others and collects 2k + 1 matching requests as a certificate to continue the following operations. For more information about BFT please refer to [4] . A normal BFT-S procedure with single client is shown in Figure 4 . BFT-S improves BFT in three aspects. Firstly, a replica group can be a client of BFT-S. Secondly, in BFT-S all requests from the same replica group can be processed in parallel. This property will greatly reduce the unnecessary message cost in BFT-2PC protocols. Finally, clients have no necessary to know the primary of a replica group. We have the following theorem directly from BFT.
THEOREM 1 BFT-S call tolerate no more thall l n3 1 J faulty members of a n-size-g rollp.
Distributed Atomic Operations
Two Byzantine fault tolerant atomic commit protocols (BFT-ACP) are introduced in this section. Our BFT-ACP protocols can be combined with 2PC or 3PC protocols and named as BFT-2PC and BFT-3PC respectively. We discuss BFT-2PC under Symmetry Configuration (BFT-2PC-SC) and BFT-2PC under Asymmetry Configuration (BFT-2PC-AC) protocols in this section.
Two BFT-2PC Protocols
During the execution of a distributed transaction, the replica group that received the requests from clients is called coordinator group and the others are called participant groups.
After accepting a distributed transaction from a client, the coordinator group carries out the phase pre-prepare, prepare and commit of BFT-S to achieve an agreement. After that, the request will be logged into the stable storage for further recovery in case of malicious transactions. Then, BFT-2PC-SC or BFT-2PC-AC will be carried out according to the system configuration.
The BFT-2PC-SC protocol is described as follows.
Phase one: request to prepare. Coordinator group symmetrically sends (SYMMETRIC-REQUEST, REQUEST-TO-PREPARE, t, ClUe to all partic-ipant groups. Each participant group starts a BFT-S for the request to prepare.
Note t in the request should be same, which can be implemented by selecting the same one as that of the original distributed transaction.
Because the t is used to guarantee the semantic of 'exactly once so it will not be confused even if two different requests have same timestamps. Each replica in coordinator group makes a decision for 'commit' if all replies received from all participant groups are PREPARED. Otherwise, it decides 'abort'. In both cases, all replicas should achieve agreement on their decisions to provide consistency, which is implemented by multicasting the decision of each replica and collecting 2J + 1 matching decisions if the coordinator group is a 3J + I-size-group.
The coordinator group notifies all participant groups to 'commit' or 'abort' the transaction by symmetric sending the request (SYMMETRIC-
REQUEST, COMMIT, t, C)ac or (SYMMETRIC-REQUEST, ABORT, t, C)a c
to all participant groups respectively. Participant groups start another BFT-S procedure for the notification. Finally participant groups symmetrically send the reply (SYMMETRIC-REPLY, v, t, c, i,DONE)a; to the coordinator group.
After the coordinator group receives DONE, the coordinator group sends replies to the client. The BFT-2PC-AC protocol can be exactly described as the same as BFT-2PC-SC by replacing all symmetric sending with asymmetric sending and replacing all SYMMETRIC-REQUEST, SYMMETRIC-REPLY with ASYMMETRIC-REQUEST and ASYMMETRIC-REPLY.
Survivability
In this paper, we define that the sunJivability of a system is the probability that the system can function correctly under a given condition.
A working group d is correct if and only if every replica in d is not faulty and the communication among them is not faulty. Otherwise, the working group is afaulty working group because the operation among them cannot obtain right results.
THEOREM 2 Provided ill a distributed transaction the coordinator group is n-size-group and interacts with other participant groups, then, BFT-2PC-SC
can sunJive no more than l n3 1 J faulty working groups. PROOF SKETCH.Derived from Theorem 1. o Please note in the Theorem 2 the number of faults are quantified by the number of faulty working groups but not the number of faulty replicas in each replica group. This is because the faults can be propagated in working groups. As shown in Figure 1 , before the symmetric sending, each 4-size-group have one faulty replica that all of them can survive. After the symmetric sending, the fault of sender was propagated to the receiver, which leads to the receiver cannot survive such faults. 
where k = l n3 1 J.
PROOF. Omitted. 0 The Corollary 5 gives a lower bound of survivability of BFT-2PC-AC. When m is small enough (e.g. m = 2 or m = 3) the corollary gives the accurate survivability.
When there are m n-size-groups in the system, we compared the expected survivability of BFT-2PC-SC and BFT-2PC-AC. The expected survivability Figure 5 . We observed that BFT-2PC-AC always has better survivability than that of BFT-2PC-SC. We believe this is because the asymmetric sending has better capability of fault tolerance. The asymmetric structure of BFT-2PC-AC also contributes to its survivability.
Efficiency
The efficiency of protocols can be characterized in many aspects. We focus mainly on the communication cost and the latency in this paper.
The communication cost can be quantified by the number of messages, which depends on the implementation of the communication layer. For example, multicast could be implemented by unicast or broadcast in the lower layer. The communication costs of two methods are totally different. So we count for the messages for both two cases.
As for the latency of processing, we adopt the time model as shown in Figure 6 , which is similar to BFI's.
In the figure U is the time of multicasting. All messages received by receiver are queued in the buffer of receiver. The receiver needs time TQ to process the message queue. Finally, the receiver needs time TE to execute the request.
Based on our time model, the latency of a procedure can be described as equation (3) in its critical path.
(3)
Because all participants can execute in parallel, so in the critical path , TE can be denoted by equation (4) . (4) In the equation, TT is the executing time of the transaction, Tc is the time of executing one BFT-S by coordinator group, Tp is the time of executing one BFT-S by participant group, Tv is the time of voting in coordinator group, til is the signature time for a single message and N sig is the total number of messages that need be signed in the critical path.
Regardless the topology of network and the detail of implementation, for simple analysis we just assume the multicast time U is in proportion to the total number of messages Nand TQ is in proportion to the total length of message queue Nq in the critical path. Then we have equation (5). (5) In the equation tm is the unit time to transmit a message and tq is the unit time to process a message in the queue. So, we have the latency described with equation (6) .
Suppose we have m n-size-groups, they can be configured in either symmetry or asymmetry. We compared their communication costs and latency. The parameters for latency evaluation is shown in Table 1 . Some default values [8] . When the multicast is implemented by unicast communication the latency of two BFT-2PC protocols is shown in Figure 7 . According to the results, BFT-2PC-AC is not a pragmatic scheme due to its poor latency while BFT-2PC-SC demonstrates better results. Also the total number m of replica groups has great impact on the latency of BFT-2PC-AC.
When the multicast is implemented by broadcasting the latency of two BFT-2PC protocols is shown in Figure 8 . In the figure, the latency of BFT-2PC-SC and BFT-2PC-AC do not deviate too much. Both of them have reasonable latencies and are practical. Latency when multicast is im- Figure 8 . Latency when multicast is implemented by unicasting plemented by hroadcas ting
Discussion
Our two BFT-2PC protocols demonstrated how to carry out distributed operations among replica groups while offering the capability of intrusion masking. Other distributed operations, such as termination protocol , failure handling and optimization [3] ( e.g. Presumed Abort or Presumed Commit) can be constructed in similar approach .
Quorum replication [9] can also have the capabil ity of intrusion masking. But quorum replications usually restrict operations (read and write) and needs locks to access variables. State machine approach based algorithms has no limitation on operations and could have better performance as BFT does.
Because our approaches bases on state machine approach they cannot handle consistent malicious requests sent by malicious clients. The techniques of recovery from malicious transactions [l] have been studied in recent years. These techniques can be integrated into our scheme because we can store accepted requests into stable storage. When the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) recognized the malicious requests, the system should isolate and confine the destroyed data, then start a consistent recovery request to recover from malicious transactions. If the malicious transactions are distributed, the recovery can be carried out with our BFT-2PC protocols.
Distributed operations implemented by reliable multicast and voting have been suggested in [12, 7] . Their communicating costs and voting cost are much more than ours.
Conclusions and Future Work
We proposed two intrusion masking 2PC protocols for distributed operations. The survivability and efficiency of two protocols have been studied. According to our analytic results both of two BFT-2PC protocols can survive Byzantine faults and are practical. No Byzantine agreement algorithm is needed in our protocols. We will apply our techniques into other distributed operations and investigate the impact in the future researches.
